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I. Introduction
Delaware Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster suggested in his
decision In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders Litigation1 that “if boards
of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute
resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”2
Since Revlon was decided on March 16, 2010, over 195 Delaware
corporations, including 27 in the S&P 500, have followed the Vice
Chancellor’s suggestion and adopted a forum selection clause in
their governing documents.3
Vice Chancellor Laster’s suggestion is a response to the
perceived two-pronged problem of (1) duplicative litigation over
corporate transactions in Delaware and other forums and
(2) other state courts applying Delaware law.4 From the
viewpoint of a Delaware corporation, both prongs are
problematic. First, duplicative litigation is more expensive than
litigation in a single state and may even result in a split decision,
1. See In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 961 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(holding that plaintiff’s lead counsel’s efforts to litigate the case had been
inadequate and replacing the firm with a new lead counsel).
2. Id. at 960.
3. Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and
Bylaws 1 (Jan. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that 195 Delaware
corporations have adopted a forum selection clause as of December 31, 2011) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Corporations are governed by a
charter and bylaws, which together make up a corporation’s governing
documents. See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 278–79 (2007).
4. While the inverse—Delaware applying another state’s law—is also
problematic because Delaware’s corporate law is universally accepted as the
most highly developed corporate case law, the application of Delaware’s law is a
larger problem than the inverse.
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with one state’s court system siding with the corporation and the
other state’s court system siding with the plaintiff.5 Second, other
state courts applying Delaware law is—as one litigator has put
it—“like taking Gallatorie’s secret recipes and giving them to a
Jack-In-The-Box short-order cook. It doesn’t always work so
well.”6 While this statement shows the very high regard in which
Delaware lawyers hold Delaware judges, this statement also
illustrates the advantage of a system in which only the courts of
the state whose law is to be interpreted rule on that law.7
This Note will argue that corporations and society in general
are detrimentally affected by plaintiffs’ bar filing in multiple
jurisdictions against a single action or transaction; that Delaware
corporations should enact a forum selection clause to protect
themselves from these useless expenses; and that courts should
enforce these clauses.
Part II will open by examining the evidence that plaintiffs’
attorneys are choosing to file their cases against Delaware
corporations outside of Delaware and will look at several
explanations of their motivation in doing so. It will then argue
that this trend is detrimental to corporate defendants and society
in general. It will then examine the strength and utility of the
internal affairs doctrine and forum non conveniens in preventing
duplicative litigation.
Part III will propose the use of choice of forum clauses as the
best potential solution to the aforementioned problem. This Note
will examine the policy underlying choice of forum clauses. It will
then examine the legal history of forum selection clauses in
federal and Delaware courts. It will then discuss the likelihood of
enforcement in both federal and state courts and the arguments
5. Claims in multiple states are a common occurrence. A partner with
New York-based firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz estimates that 50% of
mergers and acquisitions transactions by Delaware-incorporated companies
caused lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions. William Savitt, Exclusive Venue
Provisions For Corporate Cases, NAT’L L.J., June 7, 2010, at 10.
6. Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests
Some Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17.
7. Of course, this statement ignores the response that the American
judicial system allows the plaintiff to choose where to sue because failure to do
so might prevent the plaintiff from having his day in court. This
counterargument will be considered later in the Note. See infra Part III.A
(discussing the policy behind forum selection clauses).
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that should be made in a clause’s favor in different courts. It will
look at the previous use of these clauses by corporations, and will
discuss the different choices that a corporation must make in
drafting a proposed forum selection clause.
II. Problem of Cases Increasingly Decided Outside the State of
Incorporation
A. Evidence of Plaintiffs Fleeing Delaware Jurisdiction
Delaware commentators have consistently found that cases
involving Delaware corporations are increasingly being decided
outside of Delaware courts.8 A study of venue choice was
conducted by John Armour, Bernard Black, and Brian Cheffins,
who examined corporate law claims brought against directors of
Delaware public corporations that resulted in written decisions
from 1995 to 2009 and tracked the percentage of these decisions
issued by Delaware courts, other state courts, and federal courts.9
The study found that the number of written Delaware court
opinions remained steady throughout the period, but the
percentage of all written opinions in the field that were issued by
Delaware courts declined slowly from a high of 80% in 1995 to
65% in 2002. During 2005–2009, however, Delaware’s share had
dropped precipitously to an average of 31% of cases involving
claims against directors of Delaware public corporations.10
8. See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s
Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1351–64 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al.,
Balancing Act]; John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware
Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter
Armour et al., Losing Cases], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404;
Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
349, 350 (2012); Brian M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and
Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 143–56
(2011).
9. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1353. The study included
written decisions only because the authors wanted to focus on the significant
decisions that would make a difference in the richness and value of Delaware
law as precedent. See id. at 1353–54 (stating that written decisions were a
“crude” proxy for determining whether Delaware’s rich body of precedent was
under threat).
10. Id. at 1354. The study shows a surprising growth of federal court
opinions. The authors posit that this growth may have occurred due to the
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is one area in which this
trend is most pronounced. A study of merger transactions by
Brian Quinn revealed the same trend away from Delaware found
by Armour, Black, and Cheffins.11 Quinn examined 119 merger
transactions of more than $100 million that involved solvent
Delaware public corporations.12 Of 119 transactions, ninety-seven
(82%) had subsequent merger-related litigation.13 Of those
transactions with subsequent litigation, eighty-two (85%)
involved multiple lawsuits, with an average of 5.3 per
transaction.14 In addition, of those transactions that involved
subsequent litigation, fifty were litigated in multiple
jurisdictions.15 Forty percent of the cases were litigated
exclusively outside of Delaware.16
Jennifer Johnson conducted a similar study in 2010 by
tracking in which forum M&A plaintiffs brought their claims.
Johnson found that, of 193 M&A defendants incorporated in
Delaware, roughly 40% of cases were filed in Delaware, another
40% were filed in other state courts, and the remaining 20% were
filed in federal courts.17
In their study on venue choice, Armour, Black, and Cheffins
also examined the twenty-five largest merger transactions each
number of federal securities claims and the availability of supplemental
jurisdiction that allows plaintiffs to attach these claims to claims over which the
federal courts have jurisdiction.
11. Compare id. at 1358 (noting the trend away from Delaware, although
expressing uncertainty when it began), with Quinn, supra note 8, at 148 tbl.2
(finding the same trend away from Delaware in public company mergers
litigation).
12. Quinn, supra note 8, at 147. The study excluded buybacks, exchange
offers, and partial acquisitions. Id. at 147 n.35.
13. Id. at 148 tbl.1.
14. Id. at 148 tbl.2; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 372 fig.7 (comparing
state class action filings in the M&A context with federal class actions in the
same context).
15. Quinn, supra note 8, at 148 tbl.2.
16. Id.
17. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 374 fig.8 (finding that, of 193 M&A filings
against defendants incorporated in Delaware, 103 were filed in Delaware, 115
were filed in other states, and 47 were filed in federal court). Johnson’s study
also shows a marked increase in M&A litigation in federal court during 2009
and 2010. See id. at 372 fig.7 (comparing the number of claims brought in state
courts against the number of claims brought in federal court).
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year during 1994–2009.18 These large mergers are what
Stevelman describes as the “crown jewels” and “the most valueproducing ‘brands’ in Delaware corporate law.”19 Of the 400
transactions studied, 256 involved companies incorporated in
Delaware,20 and shareholders filed suit in 121 of 256 transactions
(47%).21 Between 1994 and 2001, litigation contesting these
mergers was filed in Delaware an average of 69% of the time.22
After 2001, the average dropped to 31%.23
The study also notes that, prior to 2001, Delaware routinely
hosted at least part of the litigation in any given case and was
often the exclusive forum. Indeed, in 2001, Delaware provided the
exclusive forum for all twenty-five mergers that the study
examined during that year.24 After 2001, however, Delaware
became one of many forums, and, in roughly half of the cases
studied, plaintiffs did not use Delaware’s courts at all.25 Although
the trend of completely excluding Delaware has shifted back
significantly—only 20% of M&A litigation over the twenty-five
largest transactions during 2009 was exclusively outside of
Delaware26—Delaware no longer regularly serves as the exclusive
forum. In 2009, none of the twenty-five M&A transaction disputes
were litigated exclusively in Delaware, even when many of the
transactions included Delaware-incorporated companies.27
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are another context in which the
“flight from Delaware” has been found. Armour, Black, and
Cheffins again provided the initial study. They studied 477
LBOs28 that occurred from 1995 to 2009, of which 300 involved
18. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1356. Armour, Black, and
Cheffins studied the twenty-five largest mergers of publicly held, U.S.-based
companies as measured by transaction value. Id.
19. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 74, 127 (2009).
20. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1356.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1357.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1358 fig.5.
25. Id. at 1358.
26. Id. at 1358 fig.5.
27. Id.
28. Armour, Black, and Cheffins only considered those public companies
that had filings on EDGAR. Id. at 1359.
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buyouts of Delaware corporations.29 Of these 300 LBO
transactions, 141 (47%) resulted in litigation.30 Although the
authors note that the frequency of LBOs rose or fell with market
cycles, 73% of all LBO-related litigation filed before 2001 was
filed in Delaware.31 From 2002 to 2009, only 45% of LBO-related
litigation involving a Delaware corporation was filed in
Delaware.32 For LBO-related litigation, however, the alternative
venues were other state courts, not federal courts.33
Options backdating litigation formed the third area of study
for Armour, Black and Cheffins.34 They identified 127 Delaware
corporations that faced 234 option backdating lawsuits asserting
breach of fiduciary duty claims.35 Of these lawsuits, only 26 (11%)
were brought in Delaware, while 115 (49%) lawsuits were
brought in federal courts, and another 93 (40%) actions were
brought in state courts other than Delaware.36 Compared to
mergers and LBOs, the amount of options litigation in federal
court is extremely high, but this is explained by the fact that
options backdating cases generally meet federal diversity
requirements.37 The point is, however, that breach of fiduciary

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1360.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1360 & fig.7.
34. Option backdating occurs when the corporation gives an option to
purchase stock to its directors or officers but falsifies records to show that the
option was granted earlier when the stock price was lower. By backdating the
grant of the option, the corporation did not have to report as compensation the
difference between the exercise price (the market value on the date that the
corporation supposedly gave the option) and the share’s market value on the
date when the executive exercises the option. This resulted in improper
accounting and tax treatment, which in turn led to false compensation reports.
See Christy L. Abbott, Comment, The Shareholder Derivative Suit as a Response
to Stock Option Backdating, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 593, 597 (2009) (defining option
backdating); Armour et al., Losing Cases, supra note 8, at 14. Armour, Black
and Cheffins state that they chose options backdating because it was derivative
litigation, not direct litigation like mergers and LBOs. See Armour et al.,
Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1362.
35. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1363.
36. Id.
37. While plaintiffs also could bring an options backdating case as a
securities class action, the derivative claims—as opposed to the disclosure
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duty claims in option backdating cases could have been litigated
in Delaware but were not. Like mergers and LBOs, option
backdating litigation moved increasingly away from Delaware.
B. Why Are Plaintiffs Fleeing Delaware?
Although both commentators and Delaware judges agree that
there is a trend away from Delaware, it is not clear why the trend
is occurring. This Note will examine several possible reasons for
this trend.
The first theory is that the plaintiffs’ bar believes that
Delaware, particularly the Court of Chancery, is too “promanagement” to provide a fair forum.38 They may base this belief
on several opinions from the Court of Chancery, especially those
from Chancellor Leo Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster. In his
opinion In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholder Litigation,39
Chancellor Strine expressed his doubts about the true utility of
the plaintiffs’ bar, criticizing its members’ tendency to follow
takeover announcements with “hastily-filed, first-day complaints
that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and its
client to get into the medal round of the filing speed (also
formerly known as the lead counsel selection) Olympics.”40
Vice Chancellor Laster has also expressed frustration with
several shareholder suits brought by the plaintiffs’ bar. In Revlon,
he took control of the case away from lead counsel, finding that

claims under federal law—were more popular because a federal action under 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 must allege a “material” misstatement. Armour et al., Losing
Cases, supra note 8, at 15; see also Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive
Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
38. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys who responded to Armour, Black and
Cheffins admitted that they preferred to avoid Delaware, but these were
counterbalanced by those who always filed in Delaware and those who preferred
to take a case-by-case approach. See Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8,
at 1350.
39. In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642 (Del. Ch.
2005) (holding that the appropriate attorney fee award was $1.275 million
rather than $4.95 million as agreed to in the settlement because the attorneys
had not sufficiently contributed to the favorable settlement to merit the higher
award and the hours worked were excessive).
40. Id. at 608.

THE POWER OF A SUGGESTION

2075

the firm had not adequately represented its client.41 The Vice
Chancellor took the opportunity to comment further:
The resulting system involves little real litigation activity,
generates questionable benefits for class members, provides
transaction-wide releases for defendants, and offers a good
living for the traditional plaintiffs’ bar. In a legal system that
values representative litigation as a positive force, the
business model of filing and free-riding has nothing to
commend it.42

Laster has maintained this stance in other cases. During a
conference for the case In re Compellent Technologies,43 the Vice
Chancellor complained to the firms competing to be named lead
counsel that “[t]he whole problem is the diversion of interests
between entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ counsel and the class. You all
maximize by getting the most fee for the least work.”44 On
another occasion, he criticized typical takeover suits, saying “[a]
lot of these sue-on-every-deal cases are . . . worthless, they’re
simply we see the announcement, then we file,” and even
appointed special counsel to investigate possible collusion
between plaintiffs and defense counsel in the case.45
In a system in which the plaintiffs’ bar depends on
contingency fees from cases that the judge may dismiss and
settlements that the judge must approve, the use of words such
as “questionable benefits” and “free-riding” by the Vice
Chancellor must worry the plaintiffs’ bar. It is unlikely, however,
that words of frustration from two members of the Chancery
would be enough to cause the widespread flight from Delaware,
especially when the complaints are limited to takeover cases.
While these opinions may be part of the reason why plaintiffs are
more reluctant to file in Delaware, something more is at work.
41. In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 958 (Del. Ch. 2010).
42. Id. at 959–60.
43. In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL
6382523, at *28 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (finding that plaintiffs’ lawyers gained
significant results in settlement that resulted in modification of deal protection
provisions and rescission of the Rights Plan and awarding $2.3 million in
attorney’s fees, but finding that the supplemental disclosures settlement was
not significant and awarding only $100,000 in attorney fees).
44. In re Compellent Technologies, C.A. No. 6084-VCL *7 (Jan. 13, 2011).
45. Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Courtroom Status Conference
*16 (Del. Ch., December 17, 2010).
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A second possibility explaining why plaintiffs are filing in
forums other than Delaware is what Chancellor Strine derisively
called the “filing speed . . . Olympics”46 and the selection of lead
counsel. In most states, the first firm to file a lawsuit against the
defendant corporation regarding the litigated transaction gained
an advantage in the race to become lead counsel, with its
attendant financial rewards.47 In Delaware, however, the
Chancery has shifted to an approach similar to lead counsel
selection in federal securities cases.48 Former Chancellor William
Chandler quantified this approach by identifying three factors
that Delaware courts should consider when appointing lead
counsel: the quality of the pleadings, the energy and enthusiasm
demonstrated by the various attorneys, and the size of the
economic stake each plaintiff has in the litigation.49 Armour,
Black, and Cheffins found that this approach resulted in giving
priority to firms who have an elite reputation, have successfully
represented clients in the past, and currently represent clients
with a significant stake in the litigation.50
This rule likely supports plaintiffs’ firms mainly based in
Delaware at the expense of outside firms that might not be as
specialized or experienced in takeover litigation. An outside firm
that is in a position to win the race to file is much more likely to
file in a state that follows the “filing speed Olympics” than in
Delaware, where it would be much less certain—perhaps even
unlikely—that the firm would have the reputation, quality, or
client to compete with the specialized corporate firms.
A final theory on why plaintiffs’ attorneys are filing outside
of Delaware is that Delaware is more likely than other
46. In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch.
2005).
47. Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 656 (2002) (criticizing the
lack of transparency in the lead counsel selection process).
48. Compare TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., 2000
WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (listing the Chancery’s factors for
consideration when appointing lead plaintiff), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(giving the factors used to find the “most adequate plaintiff”) (2012).
49. TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4.
50. See Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1374 (analyzing
Chancellor Chandler’s discussion in TCW Tech for criteria for appointing lead
counsel).
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jurisdictions to closely scrutinize and slash attorneys’ fees when
the judge believes such action is appropriate. Delaware courts
base attorneys’ fees on the relief obtained rather than the hours
worked, which is the primary test in most states.51 The Delaware
approach was considered the more generous to the plaintiffs’
bar,52 but beginning in 2001, Delaware courts have routinely
slashed plaintiff-side attorneys’ fees in high-profile cases.
In 2001, former Chancellor Chandler cut a $24.75 million fee
to $12.3 million after the firm gained a $180 million settlement
for shareholders.53 In 2005, Vice Chancellor Strine in Cox
Communications sua sponte reduced the attorney fee by 75%,
even though the defendants had not objected to the fee during
settlement.54 During the same year, Vice Chancellor Stephen
Lamb reduced the fee in a takeover case to 28% of the proposed
fee.55 In 2010, Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons, during his
decision In re Cox Radio,56 reduced a proposed $3.6 million fee to
$490,000,57 and Vice Chancellor Laster in Brinkhoff v. Texas
Eastern Products Pipeline Co.58 reduced a proposed $19.5 million
fee to $10 million, even though he acknowledged that the firm
had expended significant efforts in the litigation.59
51. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 497 (1987) (describing
the approach taken by Delaware on attorneys’ fees, as established in Dann v.
Chrysler Corp., 215 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1965), aff’d, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966));
see also Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980) (defining
Delaware’s approach to attorneys’ fees).
52. Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 497.
53. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1371.
54. See In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 640–42 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (finding that plaintiffs’ attorneys took no appreciable risk and did
little productive work, and therefore awarded a fee of $1.275 million instead of
the requested $4.95 million).
55. See In re Instinet Grp. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A 1289-N, 2005 WL
3501708, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2005) (reducing the attorneys’ fees from $1.623
million to $450,000).
56. In re Cox Radio Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616,
at *23 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010).
57. Id.
58. Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 396 (Del. Ch.
2010) (approving settlement as fair and reasonable, awarding $10 million in fees
and expenses to plaintiffs’ counsel, and awarding $80,000 in fees and expenses
to objectors’ counsel).
59. See id. (acknowledging plaintiffs’ counsel’s substantial efforts and
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Each of these interrelated theories has some merit, and the
answer is probably a mixture of each. It is most likely, however,
that the “flight from Delaware” is motivated primarily by the
reduced attorney fees, especially in cases that the Chancellor and
Vice Chancellors are likely to view as weak or frivolous, and
therefore likely to award very limited attorney’s fees.
C. Is the “Flight from Delaware” Harmful?
At this point, the reader might naturally feel indifferent as to
whether corporate law cases are decided in Delaware, another
state, federal courts, or all of the above. Indeed, from a litigation
viewpoint, the effect of forum selection seems only to touch the
plaintiff and defendant, with the winner at best gaining a
favorable jurisdiction in which to bring his case. This hardly
seems something for a judge or the legislature to view with
alarm. When considered from an economic perspective, however,
the view becomes radically different. Most of the defending
corporations are public and sell stock to the general public,60
which means that these shareholders—and thus the general
public—profit or suffer losses according to the corporations’
fortunes. While the fact that corporations sell stock to the general
public should not insinuate that corporations should be above the
finding that counsel’s efforts created an asset worth $100 million but reducing
fee to $10 million). There are signs that the Court of Chancery has realized that
this may be a reason why the plaintiffs’ bar has filed in other jurisdictions and
is moving to counteract this trend. For example, Chancellor Strine recently
awarded attorney fees of $304 million (15%) in a securities derivative suit. In re
S. Peru Copper Corp., No. 961-CS, 2011 WL 6382006, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2011), vacated, 2011 WL 6476919 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011). Commentators agree
that Strine sought to send a message to the plaintiffs’ bar that Delaware is still
willing to award large fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers who take large risks that pay
off. See Alison Frankel, Record $285 ml Fee Is Strine’s Message to Plaintiffs’ Bar,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://newsandinsight.
thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=35135&terms=@ReutersTo
picCodes+CONTAINS+’ANV’ (last visited Nov, 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. This is especially true for Delaware companies, which make up 63% of
the Fortune 500 and more than 50% of all U.S. publicly traded companies.
Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate
Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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law—this would create even greater harm to society—it does
mean that courts and legislatures should take action to prevent a
corporation from being forced to spend money to defend against
duplicative litigation, which requires more money to be spent on
litigation to obtain the same result in multiple jurisdictions. As
Vice Chancellor Laster noted:
Litigation is costly. So if you could envision this totality of
stockholders, they would not want to sue willy-nilly and
impose on their company the costs of defending multiple
actions in multiple fora, where the cost of briefing on just a
motion to dismiss, when you have experienced counsel from
big firms, can approach seven figures. It’s real money.61

The additional money spent on litigation would otherwise be
available for dividends or improvements to grow the company. In
addition, society must be taxed to pay for two courts to listen to
the same dispute and perhaps issue divergent opinions, which in
turn might produce additional opinions that attempt to
consolidate the first two opinions. As a result, society suffers
when litigation is not pursued efficiently in a single forum.
Once it is acknowledged that single-forum litigation is the
most beneficial to society, the question then becomes: which
forum? This Note will argue that the state of incorporation should
provide the forum for cases involving its corporations.
First, each state has a competitive advantage over all other
states in applying its law. Because of Delaware’s highly
developed corporate precedent, Delaware is a good example of a
state that has a competitive advantage in applying its own law.62
Ted Mirvis stated:
We can talk . . . in the Delaware courts about p2p and
Footnote 10 of Caremark and how Revlon duties intersect with
the Unocal scrutiny and the double helix of Siliconix . . . [but
for a judge outside of Delaware] it can be a little unnerving. I
mean, you say, “Here’s five recent decisions each of which are
61. Transcript of Record at 50:21–51:3, La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Pyott et. al., Case No. 595-VCL, Tr. at 50:21–51:3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2011)
(Laster, V.C.).
62. See Joseph Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate
Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches 16 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561.
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94 pages long and you read those five decisions and you can
sort of get a basic idea of the vocabulary.”63

The Chancellor and Vice Chancellors in the Court of Chancery
spend the vast majority of their time deciding corporate law
cases, and thus have an overwhelming competitive advantage due
to their familiarity with Delaware corporate law cases.64
Additionally, the court has streamlined procedures that help to
provide both plaintiffs and defendants with relatively quick
decisions. 65 Most importantly, the court has the advantage of
understanding the policies and purposes behind Delaware
corporate law because of the court’s in-depth familiarity gained
through constant use and application. Out-of-state courts, on the
other hand, are not as familiar with Delaware’s corporate law,
and, without the advantage of familiarity gained through
constant exposure, they are less able to comprehensively grasp
the policies and details of judicially defined doctrines that would
cause a chancellor or vice chancellor to decide in favor of one
party.66
The same logic applies with much the same force to other
states applying their own corporate law, especially those with
specialized courts that gain comprehensive knowledge of the
state’s corporate and business law. The nineteen states67 that
63. Mirvis, supra note 6, at 17.
64. See Allen, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that the Delaware courts have
developed considerable experience in dealing with corporate law issues).
65. See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters
and Bylaws, at iv (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Allen
2011] (describing policy arguments in proxy statements supporting forum
selection clauses requiring Delaware as forum) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
66. As one attorney said: “What I tell clients is that even though Delaware
law is being applied, when it’s being applied by a bench that doesn’t have as
much familiarity with these cases, the predictability goes down.” David Marcus,
Did Chancery Fee Rulings Chase Away Plaintiffs Lawyers?, DEL. L. WKLY., Nov.
29, 2006, http://www.delawarelawweekly.com/news.php?news_id=109, (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Inter-State Competition 1 (Univ. of
N.C. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 1928108, 2011) (listing the different states
that have established business and complex litigation courts in the past twenty
years). These include North Carolina and New Jersey (1996), Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and Nevada (2000), Rhode Island (2001), Maryland (2002), Florida
(2004), Georgia (2005), Colorado and Oregon (2006), South Carolina (2007), Maine,
New Hampshire, and Ohio (2008), and Alabama and Delaware (2010). Id.
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have created business courts in the last two decades share this
competitive advantage to a greater or lesser extent, based on the
degree that their case law and statutes are highly developed.
Even the remaining states where corporate cases are heard by
courts of general jurisdiction retain a competitive advantage in
deciding their own corporate law, simply by virtue of the fact that
they are more likely to hear cases involving that state’s
corporation law than out-of-state courts.
Because duplicative litigation wastes society’s resources and
the best forum to decide cases involving the corporation’s internal
affairs is the state of incorporation, the legislature and judiciary
have provided two doctrines that attempt to address the
situation. This Note will show, however, that the internal affairs
and forum non conveniens doctrines do not adequately address
the problem, and will propose that forum selection clauses be
utilized by companies and be upheld by the judiciary and
legislature as the device that best addresses this problem of
waste.
D. Internal Affairs Doctrine
Two doctrines govern the choice of law and forum for cases
involving the relationship between a corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders. The internal affairs doctrine is a
specific doctrine that applies only to the corporation’s internal
affairs, governs the choice of law, and requires that, except in a
very unusual case, the law of the state of incorporation applies.68
Forum non conveniens, the second doctrine, is a broader doctrine
that applies in all cases and affects the choice of forum by
allowing courts to refuse to accept jurisdiction over a case that is
in a proper forum but would be inconvenient,69 although modern
courts have generally regarded this choice as one of convenience
and discretion.70
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971)
(defining internal affairs doctrine).
69. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (3d ed. 2011).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 (1971),
Reporters Note (noting that the modern trend is that “jurisdiction will be
exercised unless considerations of convenience or of efficiency or of justice point
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The internal affairs doctrine (IAD) is a judicial doctrine that
recognizes that ordinarily the state of incorporation’s law must be
applied to regulate the internal affairs of a corporation, which is
defined as the relationship between the corporation and its
current officers, directors, and shareholders.71 The policy behind
the doctrine is to promote certainty in the law for a corporation
that might otherwise be faced with contradictory demands from
the federal government and different state governments.72 Thus,
as a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation will
govern cases that involve the internal affairs of a corporation.73
The latest cases from the United States Supreme Court on
the subject support the assertion that each state has clear and (at
least implicitly) exclusive authority over its domestic
corporations. For example, in Cort v. Ash,74 Justice Brennan
stated: “Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”75 A decade

to the courts of the state of incorporation as the appropriate tribunals”).
71. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (finding that Illinois
has an interest in regulating the internal affairs of a domestic corporation, but
finding that interest insufficient to allow the state to impose a substantial
burden on interstate commerce); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 302(2) (1971) (“The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied
to determine such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties . . . .”).
72. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645 (noting that without the IAD, a corporation
might otherwise be “faced with conflicting demands”).
73. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933)
(“When, by acquisition of his stock, plaintiff became a member of the corporation
he, like every other shareholder, impliedly agreed that, in respect of its internal
affairs, the company was to be governed by the laws of the state in which it was
organized.”).
74. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975) (holding derivative suit with
regard to the alleged violation of law prohibiting corporate involvement in
election campaigns cannot be impliedly authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 610, and
any remedy must be under Delaware’s corporation law), abrogated on other
grounds by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
75. Id.
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later, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,76 Justice
Powell reiterated that “[n]o principle of corporate law and
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to
regulate domestic corporations.”77 Implicit in the Court’s
statement is the assertion that it is not within other states’
authority to regulate corporations that have been incorporated in
other states.
From the standpoint of a corporation seeking certainty in the
application of state law, however, there are two problems with
the IAD. First, a state court may refuse to follow the IAD in
extreme circumstances.78 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court declared in Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade79 that it
would base a decision whether to apply the IAD on “whether the
contacts of one state to the facts of the case are so obviously
limited and minimal that application of that state’s law
constitutes officious intermeddling.”80 Courts, however, rarely
disregard the IAD81 and will only do so when a corporation has
little to no contact with the state of incorporation other than the
actual act of incorporation.82
More importantly, the IAD is a choice of law provision, and
the doctrine is not applicable in determining forum.83 This means
76. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)
(holding the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act was not preempted and did
not violate the Commerce Clause).
77. Id.
78. See Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th
1844, 1853 (1995) (applying California law to inspection of records of a Delaware
corporation); Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 677 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Wis.
2004) (applying Wisconsin law to Delaware corporation); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971).
79. See Beloit, 677 N.W.2d at 307 (Wis. 2004) (holding Wisconsin law
applies even to a Delaware corporation due to an absence of contacts between
the corporation and Delaware and because Wisconsin has not legislatively or
judicially adopted the internal affairs doctrine).
80. Id. at 307.
81. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4223.50 n.14
(citing only three cases from two jurisdictions for the proposition that not all
jurisdictions follow the internal affairs doctrine).
82. This was the case in Beloit, for example, in which the court found that
the corporation had no contacts with Delaware other than the act of
incorporation and filling bankruptcy. Beloit, 677 N.W.2d at 307.
83. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4223.50
(“[T]he internal affairs doctrine is a choice-of-law doctrine and not a bar to
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that corporations may be required to defend cases in states other
than the state of incorporation, even though that court will apply
the law of the state of incorporation.
The United States Supreme Court has often considered the
IAD in a forum non conveniens context. An early example is
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York.84 The Court in Rogers
upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case, explaining that
the IAD applied and finding that “considerations of convenience,
efficiency, and justice” warranted dismissal.85 The Court,
however, did not mandate dismissal in all cases or establish a
definitive rule.86 Instead, it analyzed the defendant company’s
activities in New Jersey to ensure that the company had not
“organized in that state as a mere matter of convenience for the
purpose of carrying on all its business in another state.”87 In
Rogers, the Court stressed the comity due to the state of
incorporation in a forum non conveniens analysis.88
In Williams v. Green Bay & Western Railroad Co.,89 the
Court ruled that IAD jurisprudence informed part of the forum
non conveniens analysis.90 Reversing the district court’s dismissal
of the case, the Court ruled “the fact that the corporate law of
another State is involved does not set the case apart for special
treatment.”91 Instead, the Court noted that the federal court’s
application of the law of a state outside its territorial jurisdiction
was only one factor that could be considered in a forum non
jurisdiction.”).
84. See Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933)
(holding the district court properly dismissed the case “without prejudice to the
enforcement of the rights of plaintiff, if any, in the courts of New Jersey”).
85. See id. (finding the facts of the case clearly fit within the internal
affairs of the company and that dismissal was appropriate).
86. See id. (“Obviously, no definite rule of general application can be
formulated by which it may be determined under what circumstances a court
will assume jurisdiction of stockholders’ suits relating to the conduct of internal
affairs of foreign corporations.”).
87. Id.
88. See Stevelman, supra note 19, at 78–79 (arguing the Court applied a
conservative approach to comity in Rogers).
89. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 553 (1946)
(ruling the doctrine of forum non conveniens was to be used as “an instrument of
justice” and reversing the case’s dismissal under that doctrine).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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conveniens analysis.92 In applying this case-by-case analysis
designed “as an ‘instrument of justice,’” the Court stressed the
ability of the federal court to decide the case and, in this instance,
provide the requested relief.93
The Delaware Supreme Court also follows the IAD. In
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis,94 the court concluded that application of
the IAD to transfer of stock from a Panamanian corporation to a
Delaware subsidiary—and thus application of Panamanian law—
was required by due process, the Commerce Clause, and
Delaware conflicts principles.95 In so doing, it rejected Norlin
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,96 a Second Circuit decision that
applied New York law to a Panamanian corporation due to
substantial contacts with New York.97 The Delaware Supreme
Court emphasized that the IAD involved “those matters which
are peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders”98
and suggested that the application of the IAD was supported by
the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.99

92. See id. at 554–57 (stating that forum non conveniens will turn on a
case-by-case analysis and that there were no special circumstances that should
have led the district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction).
93. See id. at 554, 557 (finding that the policy of fairness and justice behind
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not met in the present case).
94. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531, A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987) (holding that
Panamanian law governs under the internal affairs doctrine and reaffirming
that doctrine as “a major tenet of Delaware corporation law”).
95. Id. at 218.
96. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984)
(affirming the preliminary injunction of a transfer of 49% of stock to an
Employee Stock Option Plan and Trust and a plan for the board of directors to
vote those shares in anticipation of a hostile takeover attempt).
97. Id. at 261 (holding that New York law expressly applies to the
Panamanian corporation and prohibiting the hostile takeover defense
mechanism at issue).
98. McDermott, 531 A.2d at 214 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982)).
99. Id. at 218 (finding that the Due Process Clause requires that the
corporation’s agents “be given adequate notice of the jurisdiction whose laws
will ultimately govern the corporation’s internal affairs,” and the Commerce
Clause requires that Delaware law not apply to a Panamanian corporation).

2086

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067 (2012)

While the doctrine may be important later in determining
the enforceability of a forum selection clause,100 the IAD does not
determine which court or courts will hear the case, a situation
that leaves corporations vulnerable to identical actions in
multiple jurisdictions, even if each court will apply the
incorporating state’s law.
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Another option for a corporation seeking to defend against
litigation involving its internal affairs in the state of
incorporation is a motion for change of venue on the basis of
forum non conveniens.101 A court may not grant a forum non
conveniens motion if an adequate alternative forum is not
available.102 The United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v.
Gilbert103 listed nine factors that are relevant in forum non
conveniens analysis: (1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the availability of
compulsory process and cost of attendance for witnesses; (4)
possibility of view of premises if appropriate, (5) the pendency or
nonpendency of a similar action in another jurisdiction; (6) the
ability to exercise jurisdiction over all the individual defendants;
(7) the relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial; (8) the
enforceability of the judgment; and (9) any other practical
100. See infra Part III.C (noting that the IAD might be important because it
mandates that the court apply the law of the incorporating state in determining
whether the forum selection clause is enforceable).
101. Courts may also grant stays of the action or may transfer the case to
another jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but both methods incorporate
forum non conveniens policy. See, e.g., Goodman v. Fleischmann, 364 F. Supp.
1172, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (ruling that when considering a transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court must confirm that it has jurisdiction over the case, and
must then use the Gulf Oil Corp. factors to weigh the parties’ interests to
determine whether the transfer furthers the interest and convenience of the
parties).
102. See Dirienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A
forum non conveniens motion cannot be granted absent an adequate alternative
forum.”).
103. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (holding that the
district court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and properly applied that power in the case), superseded
by statute, 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1982) (codifying forum non conveniens doctrine).
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considerations that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive.104 The Court also noted a public interest in “having
localized controversies decided at home.”105 In addition, the
burden is on the defendant making the motion to show that the
factors strongly weigh in favor of a change of venue,106 and it is
within the sound discretion of the court in granting or denying a
forum non conveniens motion, which may only be reviewed for
abuse of discretion.107
A forum non conveniens motion will only succeed if there is
an adequate alternative forum and the court is satisfied that the
defendant has met its burden in establishing that the balance of
the factors weigh in favor of finding heavy hardship to defendants
or the court.108 It would then grant a motion to dismiss, stay, or
transfer venue.109 Although the governing law in cases involving
internal affairs of the corporation will be that of the incorporating
state under the IAD, other factors may not militate towards
venue in the incorporating state. It is not certain, for example,
that the proof in the second factor or the individual defendants in
the fifth factor will be in the incorporating state. To the contrary,
over 50% of all publicly traded companies are incorporated in

104. See id. (giving factors to be considered by district court in analysis of
forum non conveniens motion).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., id. (“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”). But see Koster v.
Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (giving less weight to
plaintiff’s choice of forum in a derivative action in which there may be many
different potential plaintiffs in many different fora or in which plaintiff has only
a small financial interest and is acting on behalf of a widely scattered group of
plaintiffs).
107. See Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130–31 (1933)
(ruling that the district court was “free in the exercise of a sound discretion to
decline to pass upon the merits of the controversy and to relegate the plaintiff to
an appropriate forum”).
108. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 430 (2007) (finding that defendant faces a “heavy burden” when advocating
dismissal under forum non conveniens); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 249 (1981) (“Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where
trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or
the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of
convenience supporting his choice.”).
109. Id.
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Delaware,110 and these national and worldwide corporations have
the majority of their data and employees in states other than
Delaware.111 This does not change the fact, however, that the
corporation’s internal affairs are governed by the law of the
incorporating state, and that each state’s courts are best able to
interpret its own state law.
Turning specifically to Delaware state law, the Delaware
Supreme Court has established two doctrines to aid Delaware
courts in ruling on forum non conveniens and stay motions.112 In
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering
Co.,113 the court ruled that Delaware courts will not grant a stay
“as a matter of right by reason of a prior action pending in
another jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same
issues.”114 The court, however, supported a general rule that
“litigation should be confined to the forum in which it is first
commenced” and that the courts should be wary of defendants
seeking to defeat plaintiff’s choice of forum by “commencing
litigation involving the same cause of action in another
jurisdiction of its own choosing.”115 The court noted that the

110. Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your
Corporate Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112
YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002) (finding that 85% of corporations choosing to
incorporate out of their headquarters state choose to incorporate outside of
Delaware); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1570–74 (2002) (“[N]o state besides Delaware has had any
meaningful success in attracting out-of-state firms going public.”).
112. The Delaware Supreme Court has found no difference between a
motion on grounds of forum non conveniens and a motion to stay. See Gen.
Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 683 (Del. 1964) (“In principle we
can see no difference between a stay based upon similar grounds and an actual
dismissal of the action itself.”), overruled on other grounds by Pepsico, Inc. v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park, 261 A.2d 520 (Del. 1969).
113. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263
A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970) (holding that the superior court abused its discretion
in refusing to stay or dismiss the action pending in Delaware in light of an
Alabama action between the same parties and involving the same issues).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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policy underpinnings of comity and “the necessities of an orderly
and efficient administration of justice” support this view.116
If there is no action pending in another jurisdiction,
Delaware courts apply General Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc.,117
which is a much tougher standard than McWane.118 Under CryoMaid, the moving party must prove “overwhelming hardship”119
through any or all of the Cryo-Maid factors: “(1) the relative ease
of access to proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for
witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view of the premises, if
appropriate; (4) all other practical problems that would make the
trial of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive;” and
(5) “whether or not the controversy is dependent upon the
application of Delaware law which the courts of this state more
properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction.”120
The IAD and forum non conveniens motions mandate the use
of the incorporating state’s law and in some cases dismissal or
stay of an action in another jurisdiction in favor of those of the
incorporating state. While these are both positive developments,
a defendant corporation may face actions in two courts, and must
attempt to convince one or the other to grant a forum non
conveniens motion to stay or dismiss.121 Even if one court is
willing to dismiss or stay the case, the corporation must litigate a
forum non conveniens motion and pay the associated expenses.
Frequently, however, both courts are unwilling to dismiss or stay

116. Id.
117. See Cryo-Maid, 198 A.2d at 684 (affirming the vice chancellor’s stay of
Delaware action in favor of later-filed Illinois action when factors established
favor the later action).
118. See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.5 (3rd ed. 2010) (noting that
Cyro-Maid is a tougher standard to meet than McWane because defendants
must prove “overwhelming hardship”).
119. Gen. Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964),
overruled on other grounds by Pepsico, Inc. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury
Park, 261 A.2d 520 (Del. 1969).
120. Id.
121. The corporation may be forced to defend the same action in even more
than two courts. In M&A transactions, for example, there are an average of four
actions for each transaction, with one transaction resulting in forty-one separate
suits. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces
of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1769 (2004).
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in favor of the other.122 In this case, the corporation faces the
unenviable position of defending the same litigation twice or
more. The use of a forum selection clause in a corporation’s
governing document—if effective—would put an end to this
unnecessary litigation. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in another context: “[A] clause establishing ex ante the
forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling
any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought and
defended.”123
III. Use of Forum Selection Clauses in Governing Documents
A. Policy Supporting Forum Selection Clauses
The reasons why forum selection clauses are needed have
been summarized by former Chancellor Chandler as “the multiforum deal litigation” problem.124 He observed:
[T]he fallout of [multi-forum deal litigation] has become
increasingly problematic in recent years as more and more of
these cases are filed in multiple jurisdictions. Judges, defense
counsel, and the plaintiffs’ bar are now routinely confronted
with these sorts of disputes and have yet to come up with a
workable solution. The potential problems, as one can imagine,
are numerous. Defense counsel is forced to litigate the same
case—often identical claims—in multiple courts. Judicial
resources are wasted as judges in two or more jurisdictions
review the same documents and at times are asked to decide
the exact same motions. Worse still, if a case does not settle or
consolidate in one forum, there is the possibility that two
judges would apply the law differently or otherwise reach
different outcomes, which would then leave the law in a
confused state and pose full faith and credit problems for all
involved. . . . The problems do not end there. In the event that
122. Compare, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 954 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (denying motion to stay or dismiss because Delaware had a
particularly strong interest in addressing new issues in its own law), with In re
Topps Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (denying motion to stay or dismiss because the New York
action was the first filed).
123. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
124. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL
1135016, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011).
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defense counsel settles in Delaware over another jurisdiction,
leaving one set of plaintiffs’ counsel out in the cold, the
unfavored forum’s plaintiffs’ lawyers then often flock to
Delaware to oppose the settlement (and vice versa). And there
are the post-settlement or post litigation issues as well: class
certification, approval of attorneys’ fees, and then dividing
those attorneys’ fees between the various plaintiffs’ counsel.125

Chancellor Chandler identifies three main concerns: the litigation
cost of defending the same case in multiple jurisdictions, the
judicial resources wasted in redundant decisions on the same
issue, and the possibility of conflicting decisions on the same
issue.126 These concerns apply to all litigation against a
corporation, but with different rationales depending on whether
the claim is made directly against the company or by derivative
action on behalf of the company.
These concerns are at their strongest in M&A litigation,
which tends to be highly duplicative. In Cornerstone Research’s
study on security class action filings, thirty-eight of the forty
M&A actions brought in federal court were also brought in state
court.127 The other two actions related to foreign companies.128
One attorney estimates that 50% of all M&A transactions—not
just the transactions that result in litigation—generate
duplicative litigation.129 In typical M&A litigation, the
shareholder bringing the action will usually allege an unfair
transaction price or claim that the directors gave shareholders
inadequate or misleading information about the proposed
transaction.130 In other words, the shareholder is bringing a claim
on behalf of the corporation as its agent or representative against
the directors who proposed the transaction. Because the
corporation is required to indemnify these directors if they are
successful in defending themselves and are likely to indemnify
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR
IN REVIEW 33 (2011), available at www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010year-in-review.
128. Id.
129. Savitt, supra note 5.
130. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 127, at 33 (describing the
typical M&A litigation).
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them even if they are not,131 a corporation would never file
duplicative litigation when it will likely bear the costs of
defending multiple cases on the same issue. While a single
fiduciary duty action may increase the transaction’s value to the
company by requiring the board to prove the price was the best
that it could obtain and that it fairly disclosed the advantages
and risks of the transaction to the company, additional actions in
other jurisdictions add no marginal value and even present
possible holdout problems.132
While M&A litigation is the largest trouble spot for
duplicative litigation, a corporation will usually be required to
indemnify its directors for other duplicative derivative litigation.
The corporation will indemnify the successful director for
reasonable expenses as long as the action was “by reason of the
fact” that the person was a director, which would include
131. Directors and officers who are successful in defending themselves
against derivative actions are usually entitled to indemnification as a matter of
right in most jurisdictions. See 3 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 259 (3d ed. 2010). Even if the director or officer is
not successful in defending herself, she will be indemnified for her expenses (but
not any fines, judgments, or settlements) if a court or a committee of
independent directors determines that the director’s or officer’s conduct met the
standards set forth in the indemnification statute. See id. at 262–63 (citing
MBCA § 8.51(a) (2008) and DGCL tit. 8 § 145(a) (2001)). Therefore, if
shareholders initiate suits in multiple jurisdictions and the director or officer is
successful in defending, the corporation is liable for the additional expense.
Even if the shareholder is successful, the corporation is likely to pay the
expenses in order to attract skilled directors and officers. The typical
corporation will also provide director and officer (D&O) insurance. This
insurance consists of two parts: coverage to reimburse the corporation for its
costs in indemnifying its directors and officers and coverage that extends
directly to the individual officer or director for whom indemnification from the
corporation is not available or immediately forthcoming.
132. For example, if a corporation faces two actions regarding a proposed
merger and plaintiff A settles with the corporation, plaintiff B may seek a larger
settlement than A because B is the only thing standing between the corporation
and the merger. The corporation is likely to acquiesce. As Jim Pittinger noted:
“Defendants have been settling too many of these suits in order to not hold up
the underlying transaction. It’s easy to lose a payoff in the hundreds of
thousands, or even low millions, of dollars for plaintiffs’ attorneys ‘fees’ when
you have a deal in the billions or tens-of-billions with fees already in the
multimillions for assorted lawyers, underwriters, etc.” CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
supra note 127, at 33. The absurdity of this reality is apparent when it is noted
that an additional action adds no marginal value to the company, even if
successful.
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fiduciary-duty claims.133 The unsuccessful director would be
entitled to indemnification against a fiduciary duty claim if the
court finds the defendant is “fairly and reasonably entitled to
indemnification.”134 Therefore, whether the action is successful or
not, the corporation is likely to be required to indemnify its
directors and officers for their expenses in defending against
litigation brought “by reason of the fact” that the defendant was a
director or officer.135 Again, the corporation would never bring
suit against a director or officer in multiple jurisdictions because
it would, if unsuccessful, likely be forced to pay the defense’s
expenses twice. It is illogical to allow a shareholder to bring the
same claim on the corporation’s behalf in multiple jurisdictions.
In contrast to derivative litigation, a shareholder pursuing a
direct action against the company or its directors or officers acts
on her own behalf, and the understanding that the shareholder is
acting as a representative of the corporation does not apply.
There are reasons, however, why shareholders bringing direct
litigation should be bound by a forum selection clause. When the
shareholder bought the stock he either had notice of the forum
selection clause if it had been adopted or notice that the board of
directors had the authority to adopt such a provision. Indeed, the
board of directors can only adopt a bylaw including a forum
selection clause if the charter gives them this power.136 All
portions of the charter must be approved by the shareholders,
either at the founding of the corporation or in an amendment.137
Thus, the shareholder should be bound by either the prior vote to
give the board authority to amend the bylaws—and his decision
to buy stock in that company with knowledge of the board’s
authority to do so—or by the vote of the shareholders to include a
forum selection provision in the charter.138
133. COX & HAZEN, supra note 131, at 257–58, 262.
134. Id. at 264.
135. Id. at 257–58.
136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
upon the directors . . . .”).
137. See id. §§ 102, 242 (defining adoption and amendment of the certificate
of incorporation).
138. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del.
2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and procedures that bind a
corporation’s board and its shareholders.”); 10 C.J.S. Corporations § 165 (2012)
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A shareholder plaintiff may also argue that he should be
entitled to file his claim in any court with jurisdiction because he
would, in effect, lose his day in court due to his inability to travel
to the selected forum. A California plaintiff, for example, may
argue that, if the court enforces a Delaware forum selection
clause, he will be unable to litigate his case in Delaware because
of an inability to travel to Delaware because of health or travel
expenses. Putting aside the ease of interstate travel, the practical
realities of corporate litigation ensure that the plaintiff will not
be materially hindered in bringing his case.139 Unlike, for
example, a tort claim, a shareholder’s claim is not likely to
require testimony from eyewitnesses or the plaintiff himself, but
will instead involve facts gleaned from discovery and testimony
from experts, all of which are equally available in the state of
incorporation as in the plaintiff’s selected forum.
B. Legal History of Forum Selection Clauses
1. Federal Courts
Cases on forum selection clauses in any area of law are
sparse. The United States Supreme Court has decided two forum
selection cases in admiralty law,140 while the Delaware Supreme
Court’s headline case on forum selection clauses was decided in
the limited liability company (LLC) context, and that decision
was likely driven by policy considerations unique to that business
arrangement.141
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in M/S Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.142 signaled a shift in the federal courts’
(“Bylaws ordinarily are binding on the stockholders or members whether they
expressly consent to them or not.”).
139. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991)
(finding that Florida is not “a remote alien forum” for Washington plaintiffs).
140. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972); Carnival
Cruise, 499 U.S. at 595.
141. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 296 (Del. 1999)
(using broad language on mandatory forum selection provisions in deciding the
application of a forum selection provision in the LLC context).
142. M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16 (holding that forum selection clauses are
valid in international admiralty contracts unless the opposing party can show
that enforcement would be unreasonable, unjust, or invalid for fraud or
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view on forum selection clauses from disfavor on public policy
grounds to acceptance and acknowledgement that such clauses
were to be enforced unless some reason other than the mere
existence of the clause was found.143 The Court ruled that forum
selection clauses are prima facie valid and would be enforced
unless the resisting party “could clearly show that enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid
for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”144
Because there was no allegation of fraud or overreaching, the
Court only considered whether the clause was unreasonable or
unjust.145 It noted that some courts have found that a forum
selection clause may be unreasonable if it “is seriously
inconvenient for the trial of action.”146 The Court noted, however,
that the defendant who was attempting to escape the clause was
party to a freely negotiated contract that bound it to the London
forum as specified in the contract, and questioned how the
defendant could prove unreasonableness when it agreed in a
freely negotiated contract to what it was opposing in court.147
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,148 the Court applied
the M/S Bremen analysis to form contracts that had not been
negotiated.149 In Carnival Cruise, the company sent tickets that
overreaching).
143. See id. at 12 (finding that the old “provincial attitude” against enforcing
forum selection clauses is outdated and ruling that they should be upheld as a
useful and sometimes necessary addition to business contracts).
144. Id. at 15.
145. See id. (“The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum
clause specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as
fraud or overreaching.”).
146. Id. at 16.
147. See id. (“Of course, where it can be said with reasonable assurance that
at the time they entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private
international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it
is difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render
the forum clause unenforceable.”).
148. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding
forum selection clause incorporated into ticket contract enforceable despite lack
of bargaining and alleged inconvenience to the ticketholders).
149. See id. at 593 (noting that “common sense dictates that a ticket of this
kind would be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to
negotiation”).
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incorporated by reference an attached notice that all litigation
regarding disputes between the passengers and the cruise liner
must be brought in the Florida courts.150 While recognizing that,
unlike in M/S Bremen, the parties in this case had unequal
bargaining power, the Court rejected this distinction as a dividing
line for enforcement of forum selection clauses.151 The Court
instead emphasized that forum selection clauses in form
contracts should be scrutinized by the judiciary for fundamental
fairness.152 The Court equated fundamental fairness with the lack
of bad-faith motives, and cited such factors as Carnival’s
principal place of business and that many of its cruises depart
from and return to Florida ports as evidence of good faith.153
The single case that squarely addresses forum selection
clauses in a corporation’s governing documents is Galaviz v.
Berg,154 a California case involving Oracle, one of the first
corporations to utilize a forum selection clause.155 The Galaviz
court applied federal common law, which requires a mutual
agreement between the parties, even if the contract was one of
adhesion, as in Carnival Cruise.156 In the case at hand, the court
highlighted the unilateral amendment of the bylaws by the
directors after most of the alleged wrongdoing had occurred.157
150. See id. at 588 (quoting contract language).
151. See id. at 593 (“[W]e do not adopt the Court of Appeals’ determination
that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket contract is never
enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.”).
152. Id. at 595.
153. See id. (finding that Carnival has its principal place of business in
Florida and many of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports as
evidence of good faith in including a forum selection clause in the ticket
contract).
154. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying
motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause specifying Delaware’s Court
of Chancery as sole forum).
155. Oracle adopted a bylaw forum selection clause in 2006. See Allen 2011,
supra note 65, at 24.
156. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)
(rejecting the court of appeals’ holding that “a nonnegotiated forum-selection
clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the
subject of bargaining”); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12
(1972) (finding “a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power”).
157. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 n.4 (noting that Oracle would not have
been able to accomplish a unilateral amendment of the bylaws under contract
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“[W]here, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals
who are named as defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing
took place, there is no element of mutual consent to the forum
choice at all, at least with respect to shareholders who purchased
their shares prior to the time the bylaw was adopted.”158 It
distinguished Carnival Cruise and its Ninth Circuit progeny,
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A.,159 by characterizing these cases
as “merely giving effect to the bilateral agreement between the
parties”160 in the case, while it emphasized that the Oracle forum
selection clause had not been agreed to or ratified by the
shareholders.161
The Galaviz court, however, was willing to enforce forum
selection clauses when these clauses qualified as bilateral
contracts.162 It noted that if the clause fell under the Carnival
Cruise and Argueta analysis, “there would be little basis to

law).
158. Id. at 1171.
159. Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 327 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding forum selection clause). The Argueta court distilled three factors
from Carnival Cruise and M/S Bremen that would destroy the enforceability of
a contractual forum selection clause:
(1) [I]ts incorporation into the contract was the result of fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power; (2) the selected forum is
so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the complaining party will
for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court; or
(3) enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy
of the forum in which the suit is brought.
Id. at 325.
160. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The court
failed to take into account, however, the fact that shareholders authorized the
board of directors to pass bylaws. If a forum selection clause in a contract of
adhesion, such as that in Carnival Cruise, is permissible, it seems unreasonable
to refuse to enforce such a clause in a bylaw that is authorized by the
shareholders.
161. Id. at 1172. The Galaviz court found what it characterized as suspicious
facts and, if it had not struck down the clause on a contract theory, may well
have found that the facts meet the “fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power” requirement of Argueta, 87 F.3d at 327. See Galaviz, 763 F.
Supp. 2d at 1172 (finding that the board of directors passed the forum selection
clause after the vast majority of alleged fraudulent overcharges had occurred).
162. See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (“Were the Argueta factors
controlling here [because of a bilateral contract], there would be little basis for
declining to enforce the venue provision of Oracle’s bylaws.”).
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decline to enforce the venue provision.”163 The court found more
persuasive value in a charter amendment—that requires the
approval of a majority of shareholders—than a bylaw approved
solely by the board of directors.164
2. Delaware Courts
Like the federal courts, the Delaware Supreme Court has
dealt with forum selection clauses, but not in a corporation’s
governing documents. The main case decided by the Delaware
Supreme Court in this field is Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v.
Jaffari,165 in which the court upheld a forum selection clause in a
LLC agreement and found that the clause operated to strip
jurisdiction from Delaware courts in favor of arbitration in
California.166 While the court’s decision in Elf Atochem was
largely based on the Delaware LLC Act and its emphasis on
freedom of contract between the parties to the LLC agreement,167
the discussion in Elf Atochem on the Court of Chancery’s
jurisdiction is relevant to a discussion of forum selection clauses
in the corporation context.
In discussing the Delaware LLC Act’s vestment of
jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme
Court listed three purposes that this action achieved. The most
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1175 (“Certainly were a majority of shareholders to approve
such a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue provision like
those in commercial contracts would be much stronger, even in the case of a
plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against the amendment.”). For
in-depth discussion of this point, see infra Part III.E.3 (discussing the difference
between charter and bylaw clauses).
165. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291, 295 (Del. 1999)
(holding that a forum selection clause mandating arbitration in California was
enforceable due to the strong policies supporting “maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements”
and “in favor of arbitration”).
166. Id. at 287.
167. See id. at 291 (discussing the emphasis given to parties’ freedom to
contract in LLC agreements and holding that parties may contract to avoid
Delaware jurisdiction). The Court of Chancery followed Elf Atochem in a
factually similar case. See Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d
1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (applying choice of law provision to require
arbitration in Texas).

THE POWER OF A SUGGESTION

2099

important of these for purposes of this Note is the third, which
reads: “[Vesting of jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery] tends to
center interpretive litigation in Delaware courts with the
expectation of uniformity.”168 This observation illustrates the
concern Delaware courts have about the interpretation of
Delaware law by other courts, and would hold true in the
corporate context as well.
Recent case law demonstrates that forum selection clauses
would likely be upheld in corporations as well as LLCs. In Baker
v. Impact Holding, Inc.,169 Vice Chancellor Parsons noted that
Delaware’s legislature had enacted legislation in response to Elf
Atochem, effectively banning forum selection clauses that would
bind nonmanager members and limited partners in the LLC and
limited partnership contexts, respectively.170 Vice Chancellor
Parsons, however, also noted that the legislature did not amend
the General Corporation Law in a similar way171 and upheld the
forum selection clause against a former director of the
corporation.172 In addition, as has already been discussed, Vice
Chancellor Laster in Revlon agreed with Vice Chancellor Parsons
in supporting the policy behind forum selection clauses.173

168. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 292. The court also listed as policy reasons
favoring this forum selection:
1) it assured that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction it might not
otherwise have because it is a court of limited jurisdiction that
requires traditional equitable relief or specific legislation to act[, and]
(2) it established the Court of Chancery as the default forum in the
event the members did not provide another choice of forum or dispute
resolution mechanism.
Id.
169. Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032, at *1
(Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (holding forum selection clause mandating forum in
Texas applicable and enforceable to director of corporation and dismissing case
without prejudice).
170. Id. at *2 (citing amended versions of Delaware LLC Act §§ 17-109(d)
and 18-109(d)). The legislature likely amended these sections to keep Delaware
LLCs and LPs from selecting another state as the exclusive jurisdiction.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *15.
173. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960–61 (Del. Ch.
2010) (acknowledging that one possible effect of greater judicial oversight of
“frequent filers” is that they may file elsewhere, but supporting use of forum
selection clause if board of directors and shareholders believe appropriate).
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The Delaware Supreme Court has also ruled on forum
selection clauses in contracts. In Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc.,174 the
court adopted the presumption of validity instituted by M/S
Bremen and Carnival Cruise. In Ingres, the court defined the
relationship between the McWane forum non conveniens doctrine
and forum selection clauses. The court held that “where
contracting parties have a legally enforceable forum selection
clause, a court should honor the parties’ contract and enforce the
clause, even if, absent any forum selection clause, the McWane
principle might otherwise require a different result.”175 The court
also incorporated M/S Bremen’s presumption of validity and
found that forum selection clauses would be enforced unless the
opposing party “clearly show[s] that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for such
reasons as fraud and overreaching.”176
In summary, while Delaware courts have only tangentially
touched on forum selection clauses in corporate governing
documents177—and the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to
address them at all—Delaware courts seem sympathetic to
corporations utilizing these clauses to defend litigation in the
state of incorporation and willing to enforce them.
C. Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses
The arguments on the enforceability of forum selection
clauses will vary depending on whether the court is a federal
court sitting in diversity or a state court. In ruling on a forum
selection clause, a federal court sitting in diversity can take two
174. Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010) (holding that
forum selection clauses trump the McWane principle).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Several new cases have recently been filed against nine corporations
with bylaw forum selection clauses in the Court of Chancery. See Francis G.X.
Pileggi, Multiple New Suits Challenge Exclusive Forum Selection Bylaws in
Delaware Court of Chancery (Feb. 8, 2012, 11:42 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.
com/community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2012 /02/08/multiple-newsuits-challenge-exclusive-forum-selection-bylaws-in-delaware-court-of-chancery.aspx
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
These cases will help to provide precedent on this issue in Delaware.
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approaches. First, it can analyze the clause under federal
common law as articulated in M/S Bremen and Carnival Cruise
and followed by Galaviz.178 Galaviz declined to follow Delaware
corporate law and held that federal common law applied to forum
selection clauses because they are procedural in nature and thus
governed by federal law.179 In coming to this conclusion, Galaviz
followed Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci American, Inc.,180 a Ninth
Circuit case, which held that, under an Erie–Hanna analysis,181
the federal interest in upholding the federal venue rules
outweighed the state interest.182 The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits have also held that federal law governs forum
selection.183
If a federal court does find that federal common law controls,
a corporation defending a bylaw or charter forum selection clause
can argue these cases are a close analogy to the forum selection
clause in Carnival Cruise. In that case, the Court noted:
First, a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in
which it potentially could be subject to suit. Because a cruise
ship typically carries passengers from many locales, it is not
unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line
to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause
178. See Latham & Watkins, LLP, Corporate Governance Update: New
Challenges and Strategies for Designating Delaware as the Exclusive
Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes (May 2011), www.lw.com (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that Galaviz applied federal common law rather than
Delaware corporate law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (ruling
that “the enforceability of a proported venue requirement is a matter of federal
common law”).
180. Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512–13 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that forum selection clause in exclusive dealership contract
governed dealer’s tort and contract claims).
181. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), courts presiding over a diversity case must decide
whether the issue is substantive or procedural in nature. Generally, if the issue
is procedural, federal law applies. If the issue is substantive, state law applies.
See A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 360
(2d ed. 2008).
182. Manetti–Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512–13.
183. See Int’l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir.
1996); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990); Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en banc),
aff’d on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the
salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits
arising from the contract must be brought and defended,
sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to
determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources
that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions.
Finally, it stands to reason that passengers who purchase
tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case
benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that
the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be
sued.184

Each of these three policy reasons cited by the Court would be
satisfied by a typical forum selection clause in a corporation’s
governing documents. First, a corporation, like a cruise line, has
a special interest in limiting the fora in which it is potentially
subject to suit because corporations typically operate in many
different states and a single action or transaction has effects
spread over many states. Second, because the forum is already
specified, both the plaintiffs and the corporation can save
litigation expenses and the states can conserve judicial resources.
While less obvious, the corporation’s shareholders will benefit
under the forum selection clause because the corporation will not
be indemnifying or advancing litigation costs to defending
directors or officers in multiple jurisdictions.185
Corporations defending a bylaw forum selection clause under
federal common law face an uphill battle in proving a bilateral
agreement similar to that which was found in M/S Bremen and
Carnival Cruise, especially in bylaw forum selection clauses that
are passed by the board of directors. Corporations should stress,
however, that shareholders must give the board of directors
authorization to pass bylaws,186 and this authorization arguably
184. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991)
(citations omitted).
185. See supra Part II.A (describing the additional, needless costs incurred
by the corporation in indemnifying directors or officers for defending against the
same claim in multiple jurisdictions).
186. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
upon the directors.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (2011) (“A corporation’s
board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, unless . . . the
shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide that
the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw.”).
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equates to the shareholders’ half of a bilateral agreement that was
required in Galaviz.187 Uncertainty at this point, however, renders
this mutual agreement requirement under federal common law the
most persuasive argument in favor of charter, as opposed to bylaw,
forum selection clauses.188
If a defending corporation decides to take a corporate, rather
than contractual, approach, Manetti-Farrow and the cases following
it have focused on the traditional forum selection clause in a
contract,189 and can be distinguished in the bylaw or charter forum
selection clause context. In these cases, a corporation can point to
the state’s interest in enforcement of its substantive law governing
the relationship between the shareholders, directors, officers, and
the corporation itself. A corporation in this position should argue
that the balance is shifted in the state’s favor and that state’s law
should control. This argument is bolstered by the fact that the
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have all held that state law
governs forum selection.190
If a federal court follows state law, it would apply the law of the
state of incorporation due to the IAD.191 For Delaware corporations,
this would mean Delaware corporate law. As discussed previously, it
187. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding that the bylaw forum selection clause was a unilateral amendment to
the “contract” between the corporation and shareholders and declining to
enforce it).
188. See infra Part III.E.3 (comparing the advantages and shortcomings of
charter and bylaw forum selection clauses).
189. See, e.g., Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 511
(9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the issue in the case was contracts that included
identical forum selection clauses, which provided: “For any controversy
regarding interpretation or fulfillment of the present contract, the Court of
Florence has sole jurisdiction”).
190. See Nutter v. New Rents, Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 WL 193490, at *6
(4th Cir. Oct. 1, 1991); Farmland Indus., Inc v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities,
Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (choosing to apply state law to forum
selection clauses); Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d
352, 356–57 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping
Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding in dicta that forum
selection clauses involve venue issues and are therefore procedural clauses
governed by federal law). Farmland Industries was decided after Sun World
Lines and specifically distinguished Sun World Lines as an admiralty case.
Farmland Industries, 806 F.2d at 852.
191. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)
(“No principle of corporate law and practice is more firmly established than a
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations.”).
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seems likely that Delaware law would enforce charter or bylaw
forum selection clauses, although the case law admittedly remains
undeveloped.192
If a corporation seeks to enforce a forum selection clause in
state court, the decision is simpler. Under the IAD, the court must
apply the law of the state of incorporation, which for a Delaware
corporation would be Delaware. If a court finds that Delaware law
requires dismissal, it will only decline to enforce a forum selection
clause if it finds that the state in which the court sits requires that
result as a matter of public policy.
A potential example of this scenario might occur under § 2115
of the California Corporations Code, which provides that a
corporation, the securities of which are not traded on a national
exchange, which transacts more than half of its business in
California, and which has more than half of its voting stock held by
California residents, is subject to California corporate law.193
Because California courts have applied § 2115 to corporations
incorporated outside of California as long as they have sufficient
contacts with the state,194 it is possible, even likely, that a
California court may refuse to stay or dismiss the action because it
believes that California has the largest stake in protecting resident
shareholders and employees and that this interest trumps
Delaware’s interest in regulating the internal affairs of its
corporation.195 However, if California courts take this approach, it
192. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Delaware case law on forum selection
clauses).
193. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (2012); see also Sara Lewis, Transforming
the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution,
14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 201 (2008) (describing and discussing CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2115).
194. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr.
3d 56, 68–69 (recognizing the validity of the internal affairs doctrine, but
applying § 2115 to the corporation because of sufficient contacts with
California).
195. Id. at 217. Proponents of Section 2115 would point to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971), which provides that any state
may apply its own law in “the unusual case” in which it has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and to the parties than the incorporating state.
These proponents would argue that this is exactly what California’s law
accomplishes. The problem with this argument is that use of this exception is
extremely rare. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 4223.50 n.14 (citing only two cases that utilized this exception).
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arguably conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and may result
in a certiorari grant by the Supreme Court.196
D. Previous Use of Forum Selection Clauses by Corporations
The history of the forum selection clause really begins with
Revlon. For the 195 Delaware corporations that have currently
adopted or are in the process of adopting choice of forum
provisions, 189 (96.9% of all forum selection clauses either adopted
or in the process of being adopted) adopted the provision after
Revlon.197 By any standard, Revlon has had a substantial effect on
corporations and corporate attorneys and heightens the need for
clarity in this area.
Of the 192 Delaware corporations, 103 adopted forum
selection clauses in connection with an initial public offering,
making this by far the single most common scenario.198 Another
forty-six clauses (23.6%) were adopted concurrently with other
bylaw amendments, usually as part of annual bylaw reviews.199
Sixteen (8.2%) were adopted by board of directors on a stand-alone
basis.200 Five (2.6%) adopted forum selection clauses while
emerging from bankruptcy protection.201 Ten (5.1%) took
advantage of forum selection clauses when reincorporating in
Delaware.202
According to Joseph Grundfest, forum selection clauses have
evolved in clusters, each based on an initial wording that was copied
by “descendants” in that group.203 Grundfest has termed the first
attempt at forum selection clauses the Gibson Dunn cluster.204

196. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89 (“No principle of corporate law and
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic
corporations.”); Grundfest, supra note 62, at 23.
197. Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 3 (noting that forum selection clauses
tended to occur in clusters).
204. Id. at 4.
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Figure 1
Gibson Dunn
Cluster

Any action brought by any stockholder against the Corporation or against
any officer, director, employee, agent or advisor of the Corporation, including
without limitation any such action brought on behalf of the Corporation,
shall be brought solely in a court of competent jurisdiction located in the
State of Delaware.

This cluster included Standard Pacific, Inc. in 1991, CKE
Restaurants, Inc. in 1994,205 and Kennedy-Wilson, Inc. in 2009.206
Identical in wording, these early attempts at forum selection limited
jurisdiction over shareholder suits against “any officer, director,
employee, agent or advisor of the company” to “a court of competent
jurisdiction located in the State of Delaware.”207
Lasting development in forum selection clauses built upon
clauses adopted by Oracle, Inc. in 2006, Netlist, Inc. in 2006,
Netsuite, Inc. in 2007, and Financial Engines, Inc. in 2009.208
Figure 2
Oracle,
Inc.
Netlist,
Inc.

Netsuite,
Inc.

The sole and exclusive forum for any actual or purported derivative action
brought on behalf of the Corporation shall be the Court of Chancery in the State
of Delaware.
The Delaware Chancery Court shall be the sole forum and venue for any lawsuit
or legal proceeding by the corporation against any of its directors or officers
within the jurisdiction of that court. The state or federal courts located in the
State of Delaware shall be the sole forum and venue for any lawsuit or legal
proceeding by the corporation against any of its directors or officers not within
the jurisdiction of the Delaware Chancery Court.
Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim
of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action
asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, (iv) or any
action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine.

205. Id.
206. Id. (grouping Standard Pacific and CKE Restaurants); Allen 2011,
supra note 65, at 7 n.42 (noting that Standard Pacific, CKE Restaurants, and
Kennedy-Wilson Holdings have identical forum selection clauses).
207. See Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, § 8.5) (Sept. 24,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1408100/000104746
909008529/a2194546zex-3_11.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
208. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4.
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Unless the corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of
the corporation, (ii) any action asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed
by any director, officer, or other employee of the corporation to the corporation or
the corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant
to any provision of the DGCL, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the
internal affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring
any interest in shares of capital stock of the corporation shall be deemed to have
notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article VII, Paragraph D.

The Oracle clause was the simplest. It encompassed all
derivative actions and required these to be litigated in the
Delaware Court of Chancery.209 Netlist was similar, but bound
the corporation to bring all actions against its directors and
officers in the Delaware Court of Chancery, or, if the Chancery
did not have jurisdiction, in Delaware state or federal court.210
This seems to be a poorly worded option because it is not clear
whether Netlist is attempting to follow Oracle in encompassing
all derivative litigation or only circumstances in which the
corporation itself sues a director or officer.
Netsuite’s and Financial Engines’ clauses were more complex
and much broader than the language in either the Gibson Dunn
cluster or the Oracle clause. Instead of covering only derivative
actions as the previous clauses had done, the Netsuite/Financial
Engines language covered both derivative actions and claims in
which the Delaware courts would have a competitive advantage
over other courts in applying Delaware law.211 The difference
between Netsuite’s and Financial Engines’ language, however,
was the choice made between mandatory forum selection in the
Netsuite clause and elective forum selection in Financial
Engines.212 The advantages and disadvantages of these options
will be evaluated later.213
209. See Oracle, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, § 9.07) (Jul. 14, 2006).
210. See Netlist, Inc., Bylaws (Form S-1, § 5.12) (Oct. 23, 2006).
211. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 16 (noting that “each state has a
competitive advantage over other state courts in interpreting its own state’s
law”).
212. Compare Netsuite, Inc., Bylaw (Form 8-K, art. 8) (Dec. 26, 2009)
(“Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . .”), with Financial Engines,
Inc., Charter (Form 10-Q, art. D) (Dec. 9, 2009) (“Unless the corporation
consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . .”).
213. See infra Part III.E.2.
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After Revlon was decided on March 16, 2010, forum selection
clauses proliferated.214 Grundfest divides these clauses into the
Skadden, Pillsbury, Simpson, K&E, and Grundfest clusters.215
Figure 3
Skadden
cluster

Skadden
cluster–Swift
Transportation
exception

Pillsbury
cluster

Unless the Corporation (through approval of the Board of Directors)
consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court
of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive
forum for (i) any actual or purported derivative action or proceeding
brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim
of breach of fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders,
(iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of
the GCL, (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal
affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise
acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation
shall be deemed to have notice of and to have consented to the
provisions of this Article FOURTEENTH.
Unless the Corporation otherwise consents to an alternative forum in
writing, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the
sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding
brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim
of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders,
(iii) any action asserting a claim against the Corporation arising
pursuant to any provision of the DGCL or the Corporation’s Certificate
of Incorporation or By-Laws or (iv) any action asserting a claim against
the Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Any person
or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of
capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and
consented to the provisions of this Article THIRTEENTH.
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding bought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director,
officer, or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising
pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs
doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any
interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to
have notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article VII.

214. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
215. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 5. The Grundfest cluster consists
exclusively of limited partnerships and limited liability companies, and thus will
not be discussed in this Note.
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Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director,
officer, employee or agent of the Corporation to the Corporation or the
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising
pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or (iv) any action asserting a
claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine, in each such case
subject to said Court of Chancery having personal jurisdiction over the
indispensable parties named as defendants therein. Any person or
entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of
capital stock of the corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and
consented to the provisions of this Article X.
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on
behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of
a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the Corporation to
the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action
asserting a claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any
provision of the CGL or this Certificate or Incorporation or the
Corporation’s Bylaws or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the
Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine.

The Skadden cluster216 mainly tracks the elective Financial
Engine language, but with two notable exceptions. Swift
Transportation chose to include claims arising under the
corporation’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws as well as
those arising under the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL).217 All three clauses in the Skadden cluster assert that
holders of corporate stock are deemed to have notice of the forum
selection provision.218
Like the Skadden cluster, the Pillsbury cluster219 tracks the
elective Financial Engines language and adds a notice clause, but
unlike the Skadden cluster, does not include claims arising under
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.220

216. The Skadden cluster includes Swift Transportation Co., Primerica, and
Liberty Mutual. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4.
217. Swift Transp. Co., Charter (Form 10-K, art. 13) (Mar. 29, 2011). This
language was not followed by Primerica or Liberty Mutual’s clauses.
218. See, e.g., id.
219. The Pillsbury cluster includes Inphi Corporation, Meru Networks, Inc.,
and Chevron Corporation. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4.
220. See, e.g., Inphi Corp., Charter (Form 10-K, art. D) (Mar. 7, 2011).
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The Simpson cluster221 also tracks the elective Financial
Engines language and, like both Skadden and Pillsbury, adds a
notice clause. In addition, it provides that the forum selection
clause shall not be binding unless “the Court of Chancery has
personal jurisdiction over the indispensable parties named as
defendants therein.”222
The K&E cluster223 follows the mandatory Netsuite language,
except that—like the Skadden cluster—it governs actions
asserting a claim arising from the corporation’s certification of
incorporation or bylaws.224
E. Content of Forum Selection Clauses
1. Claims Covered by a Forum Selection Clause
For a company interested in adopting (or a corporate
attorney who will be advising clients about) a forum selection
clause, the first consideration is the coverage of the clause. As
seen in the Oracle, Netlist, Netsuite, and Financial Engines
clauses, a forum selection clause can be written to cover directors,
employees, shareholders, or any combination of these.225 Allen
identified four categories of actions generally covered by forum
selection clauses. These categories overlap to a considerable
degree, allowing what Allen characterizes as a “belt and
suspenders” approach.226 The first is any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the corporation.227 While this
would cover the majority of the claims against a corporation, it
would arguably not cover nonfiduciary duty claims and would
certainly not cover claims asserted against the corporations by
221. The Simpson cluster includes LPL Investment Holdings, Inc. and
FXCM, Inc. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4.
222. See, e.g., FXCM, Inc., Charter (Form S-1, § 10.1) (Dec. 1, 2010).
223. The K&E cluster includes Charter Communications, Inc., Chemtura
Corp., and Gordmans Stores, Inc. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4.
224. See, e.g., Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Charter (Form 8-K, art. 11) (Aug. 20,
2010) (following the Netsuite language, but adding “or this Certificate of
Incorporation or the Corporation’s Bylaws” to the third subsection).
225. See supra Figure 2.
226. See Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
227. Id. at 3.
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shareholders, directors, or employees individually. Allowing
plaintiffs to escape the forum selection clause by characterizing
the action as something other than a derivative action seems
unwise for a corporation undergoing the trouble to adopt a forum
selection clause. While covering derivative actions may be a good
start, forum selection clauses should include something more.
The second category covers any action asserting a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer to the
corporation or its stockholders.228 This is more tailored than the
first category and can be expanded to fiduciary duties owed by
employees229 or agents or advisors.230
The third and fourth categories are in line with the policy
advocated by this Note. The third category covers any action
asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the
DGCL.231 This category aligns with the reality that each state has
a competitive advantage in deciding matters involving its own
law.232 The fourth category covers any claim governed by the
internal affairs doctrine.233 This would have the blanket effect of
requiring each state to decide claims governed by its own law and
dismiss those that are not.
In addition, some companies have added other limiting
factors designed to increase the equity of restricting forum and
eliminating cases in which the court may be particularly willing
to prevent an unfair forum restriction. This Note will discuss two
of the most useful of these provisions.234 The first provision is an
228. Id.
229. See id. (finding 59.5% (116) of forum selection clauses in this category
have also addressed fiduciary duties owed by employees).
230. See id. (finding that 15.4% (30) of forum selection clauses in this
category have also addressed fiduciary duties owed by agents or advisors of the
corporation).
231. See id. at 4.
232. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 16 (noting a competitive advantage for
each state court in deciding that state’s law).
233. Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
234. The author is aware of three other special provisions, each of which
simply follows existing law and is not particularly necessary or helpful. The first
is an exception to the application of the Delaware forum selection clause when a
federal court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction of a proceeding. Latham &
Watkins, supra note 178, at 3. The second provision provides for the Delaware
Chancery Court to be the exclusive forum “to the fullest extent” permitted by
law. Allen, supra note 3, at 8. The third is a provision providing that any person
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exception to application of the forum selection provision when the
court of the chosen forum has determined that an indispensable
party is not subject to the jurisdiction of that court. Forty-eight
(24.6%) corporations with forum selection clauses included this
provision.235 This provision helps to prevent clearly unfair
situations in which a plaintiff cannot obtain complete redress,
and a court might be willing to decline to enforce the forum
selection provision in that circumstance because it prevents the
plaintiff from having his day in court.236 While useful in
restricting forum selection clauses to their legal limit, this
provision should only encompass those situations in which it is
possible to join the indispensible party in another jurisdiction.237
Currently, only one corporation has adopted this language.238
Another useful provision would be language disclaiming
retroactive application of the forum selection clause to acts or
omissions occurring before adoption. This language responds to
the Galaviz court’s concern about the retroactive effect of Oracle’s
or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in the corporation shall
be deemed to have notice of and consent to the forum selection clause. Latham &
Watkins, supra note 178, at 2. This merely follows case law concerning
corporate governance documents. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan,
953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and
procedures that bind a corporation’s board and its shareholders.”).
235. Allen, supra note 3, at 8.
236. See Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a court should decline to enforce the forum selection clause if doing
so would prevent the plaintiff from having his day in court); see also Ingres
Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010) (holding that the court will
decline to enforce the forum selection clause if doing so would be “unreasonable
and unjust”).
237. See Latham & Watkins, supra note 178, at 3 (advocating this
limitation).
238. See Avid Technology, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. 17, § 1) (Oct. 21,
2011) (including an exemption for case in which a indispensable party could not
be joined in Delaware or when a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction). The
Avid Technology clause reads:
[P]rovided that the foregoing provision shall not apply in the
event that (a) the action could not be brought in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware because of the inability to
join an indispensable party, which party could be joined in the
action in another form, or (b) a United States federal court has
properly assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
Id.
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bylaw forum selection clause.239 Currently, Boeing Company is
the only corporation to include this provision,240 although one
other company stated in its amendment proposal that adoption of
the forum selection clause would have no effect on pending
derivative proceedings.241
2. Mandatory or Elective Provision
The second consideration is whether to choose a mandatory
or elective provision. A mandatory forum selection clause
requires the plaintiff to bring the action in the jurisdiction
selected by the corporation, while an elective forum selection
clause allows the corporation to consent in writing to the
plaintiff’s choice if it sees some advantage to defending in that
jurisdiction.242 The initial forum selection clauses in the Gibson
Dunn cluster and by Oracle and Netlist were mandatory, but,
starting with Netsuite and Financial Engines, the elective
provision became an established option.243 Currently, 56.1% of
Delaware corporations with a forum selection clause specify that
the corporation may consent in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum.244 To many corporations, elective forum
selection clauses are an attractive option because they offer a
“heads I win, tails you lose” alternative. If the selected forum is
deemed to be in the company’s best interest, it will enforce the
clause. If, however, the forum in which the plaintiff brings the
lawsuit is perceived to be more favorable to the defendant
239. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“A
bylaw unilaterally adopted by directors, however, stands on a different footing.
Particularly where, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals who
are named as defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing took place . . . .”).
240. The Boeing Co., Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. VII, § 5) (Oct. 4, 2011)
(“With respect to any action arising out of any act or omission occurring after
the adoption of this By-Law. . . .”).
241. Allen, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that InsWeb Corporation included this
disclosure in its charter amendment proposal).
242. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 6.
243. See id. at 5 (distinguishing between mandatory and elective forum
selection clauses); see also Allen 2011, supra note 65, at vi (noting that the
percentage of elective forum clauses has risen from 30.8% in July 2010 to 56.1%
in August 2011).
244. Allen, supra note 3, at 8.
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company than the jurisdiction selected by the forum selection
clause, the company can consent to the alternative forum in
writing and defend there.
While the upside is great for a corporation with an elective
forum selection clause, there is some downside risk as well. With
Galaviz being the only major case on point outside of Delaware,
the enforceability of forum selection clauses in general is
uncertain, and a court may be more willing take policy into
account when deciding the enforceability of a forum selection
clause. When a lawyer seeking to uphold a forum selection clause
is required not only to argue the policy behind forum selection
clause in general but also to support an elective provision, he may
have an impossible task in convincing a judge who sees an
elective forum selection clause as too advantageous to the
corporation. The plaintiff will argue that an elective forum
selection clause allows the corporation to forum shop while
preventing the plaintiff–shareholder from doing the same.245
While this is not an exceedingly persuasive argument, the
advantages of an elective forum selection clause246 do not seem to
outweigh the risks.
3. Charter or Bylaws
The final decision that an advocate of a forum selection
clause must make is whether to place the clause in the corporate
charter or bylaws. Charters of Delaware corporations are
governed by DGCL § 102. Section 102(b)(1) authorizes
corporations to include in their charters:
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of
245. See Latham & Watkins, supra note 178, at 3 (discussing this
argument).
246. The advantages of an elective clause seem few. A corporation might be
willing to allow the plaintiff to continue the action if the action is in a favorable
jurisdiction to the defendant. If, however, the jurisdiction were favorable to the
defendant, why would the plaintiff bring the action there? In an adversarial
system in which any benefit to the plaintiff is a detriment to the defendant, the
benefit of an elective forum selection clause seems minimal.
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the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any class
or group of members of a nonstock corporation; if such
provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.247

Due to the broad nature of § 102(b)(1), corporations have wideranging authority to insert in the charter of the corporation what
its directors and shareholders deem appropriate, and this would
include inserting a forum selection clause. Charter provisions are
binding on all shareholders, whether or not they voted for the
provisions or whether or not they owned stock prior to the
adoption of the provision.248
In deciding between charter and bylaw provisions, there are
several risks and rewards that a corporation must balance.
Courts agree that charter forum selection provisions, without
exceptional circumstances, are going to be upheld. Even when
striking the forum selection clause at issue, the Galaviz court
noted: “Certainly were a majority of shareholders to approve such
a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue
provision like those in commercial contracts would be much
stronger, even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had
personally voted against the amendment.”249 Combining this
statement with the Galaviz court’s analysis of the dispute as a
contract case under M/S Bremen and Carnival Cruise, one would
predict that that court would likely have enforced a charter
provision that was approved by the shareholders, even while it
refused to uphold a bylaw provision passed by the board of
directors.
Even Revlon does not expressly mention bylaw forum
selection clauses but speaks of “charter provisions selecting an
exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”250 It does, however,
mention Oracle’s bylaw forum selection clause and approve this
possibility, at least by implication.251

247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(1) (2011).
248. See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928
(Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts among the
shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation
are held to apply.”).
249. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
251. Id. at 960 n.8.
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With great reward, however, comes great risk. Shareholders may
be unwilling to affirmatively vote in favor of a charter forum selection
provision limiting their right to sue in the most advantageous forum
available. For example, Allstate Corporation’s recent attempt to place
a forum selection clause in its charter gained support from only 41.7%
of shareholders.252 There are several ways that the corporation can
persuade reluctant shareholders. The corporation can start by
explaining the benefits to shareholders as a class. These include
(1) avoiding the possibility of costly duplicative litigation and (2) the
possibility of conflicting outcomes in different jurisdictions in the
same case, both of which lead to money saved through decreased
litigation expenses by the clause (and presumably distributed as
dividends or invested back into the company which would increase
the stock value). The corporation could also bundle the forum
selection clause with shareholder-friendly proposals, as Life
Technology Corporation did when it bundled a board declassification
amendment with a forum selection clause.253
Bylaw forum selection clauses, on the other hand, are relatively
easy to adopt as long as the board of directors has the authority to
pass bylaws under the charter.254 As is the case with charters, the
DGCL has a sweeping bylaw statute. DGCL § 109(b) states: “The
bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with
the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees.”255 In a typical corporation that provides notice that the
bylaws may be amended at any time, bylaws can be amended by the
board of directors without shareholder consent and are binding on the
shareholders.256 This eliminates the possibility of shareholder
rejection that is present in charter proposals, as occurred at

252. Allen, supra note 3, at 5.
253. Id.
254. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
upon the directors . . . .”).
255. Id.
256. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del.
2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and procedures that bind a
corporation’s board and its shareholders.”).
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Allstate.257 As long as a majority of the board of directors agrees on
the need to pass a forum selection clause, which would be
required to pass a charter provision anyway, the clause will be
adopted.
The upside of the bylaw provision is also its downside. In
Galaviz, the only case directly on point, the court refused to
enforce a board-adopted bylaw forum selection clause and
supported its holding by pointing to the unilateral way in which
the clause was adopted. Analogizing the clause to a commercial
contract, the court noted: “Here, in contrast, the venue provision
was unilaterally adopted by the directors who are defendants in
this action, after the majority of the purported wrongdoing is
alleged to have occurred, and without the consent of existing
shareholders who acquired their shares when no such bylaw was
in effect.”258 In distinguishing Carnival Cruise, the court made
much of the bilateral agreement that contained the forum
selection clause in Carnival Cruise, and emphasized the absence
of a bilateral agreement in the case before it.259 If other courts
follow the Galaviz court in applying a contractual analysis to
bylaw clauses, they could strike down these clauses with
regularity.
While bylaw clauses offer easy adoptability, their
enforceability is uncertain with Galaviz as the only case squarely
on point. If a court does decline to enforce a corporation’s bylaw
clause, the only thing that a corporation gains from the adoption
is debts from litigating the disputed clause and additional
unfavorable precedent. In addition, the corporation is unlikely to
be able to pass a charter forum selection clause when its bylaw
clause has been struck down by the courts.
Charter clauses, on the other hand, are much more likely to
be enforced by the courts under the contractual approach taken
by Galaviz.260 They are bilateral agreements voted upon by the
257. Allen, supra note 3, at 5.
258. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
259. See id. (“Under contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement
may serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them were
specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a contracting
party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual provisions.”).
260. See id.
Modern federal law plainly favors the enforcement of
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board of directors (acting for the company) and the shareholders
(acting for themselves). A corporation that can fit the adoption of
its forum selection clause into a bilateral contract approach will
be almost certain to have it upheld under a Carnival Cruise
analysis.261
4. Proposed Forum Selection Clause
The best forum selection clause depends on the current
situation of the corporation adopting one. If the corporation is in
transition, such as being on the verge of an IPO, emerging out of
bankruptcy, or reincorporating in Delaware, it should adopt a
charter amendment that reads:
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be262 the
sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any
director or officer of the Corporation to the Corporation or to
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a
claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any
provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law or the
Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation or By-Laws, or
(iv) any action asserting a claim against the Corporation
governed by the internal affairs doctrine;263 provided that the
foregoing provision shall not apply in the event that (a) the
action could not be brought in the Court of Chancery of the
State of Delaware because of the inability to join an
indispensable party, which party could be joined in the action

contractual venue clauses, but even in the case of a form
contract, a court merely gives effect to a bilateral agreement
between the parties that any disputes they may have arising out
of that agreement will be litigated in a particular forum.
261. See Carnival Cruise Line, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). This
is assuming, of course, that the corporation does not engage in actions that
would cause a court to find the clause void for violating Carnival Cruise’s
fundamental fairness test.
262. This Note advocates use of a mandatory forum selection clause for
reasons discussed earlier in Part III.E.2.
263. This Note advocates use of all four categories discussed earlier in Part
III.E.1, including the Swift Transportation addition of “or the Corporation’s
Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws.”
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in another forum, or (b) a United States federal court has
properly assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the action.264

For a public corporation, there are many possible routes, ranging
from adoption by the board of directors of a bylaw forum selection
clause to a charter amendment with a forum selection clause. As
long as its board of directors has the authority to adopt bylaws,265
it could unilaterally adopt a bylaw forum selection clause, but the
board must acknowledge the possibility that this provision may
not be enforced by the courts, as happened to Oracle in Galaviz. If
a corporation chooses this route, it should include the language in
Boeing’s clause disclaiming retroactive effect in an effort to avoid
a court following Galaviz in striking it down as a unilateral
amendment to a contract.266
There are two other options for a corporation not interested
in the arduous task of passing a charter amendment. First, a
board of directors can pass a bylaw forum selection clause and, at
the shareholders’ next meeting, propose that the shareholders
ratify the directors’ actions. This is similar to a charter
amendment, but has the benefit of only requiring a majority of
the shareholders present at the meeting rather than a majority of
all shares outstanding.267 A ratified bylaw clause would also
address the Galaviz court’s concern about a bilateral contract.268
264. This proposed clause tracks the language of Avid Corporation’s forum
selection clause, which is the most comprehensive language of any forum
selection clause. See Avid Technology, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. 17, § 1) (Oct.
21, 2011).
265. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
upon the directors.”).
266. See The Boeing Co., Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. VII, § 5) (Oct. 4, 2011)
(“With respect to any action arising out of any act or omission occurring after
the adoption of this By-Law . . . .”).
267. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011) (stating that default
quorum to amend corporation’s bylaws is a simple majority of those present at
the shareholders’ meeting and a bylaw is passed with the approval of a majority
of those present), with id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of
the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter
amendment).
268. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]
court merely gives effect to a bilateral agreement between the parties that any
disputes they may have arising out of that agreement will be litigated in a
particular forum.”).
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Alternatively, a board of directors can pass a bylaw forum
selection clause while asking that the shareholders vote at the
next shareholders’ meeting on a proposal to repeal this bylaw.
This allows the board to claim the status quo and allows the
bylaw clause to proceed without affirmative shareholder action. It
is uncertain, however, how the courts would react to what is
essentially affirmation by inaction.
A third alternative that the board of directors can take is to
propose a shareholder bylaw with a forum selection clause. This
takes advantage of the lesser voting requirements under
Delaware law for passing a bylaw rather than a charter
amendment,269 but has the contractual element required by
Galaviz.
If a corporation is more concerned about enforcement of the
forum selection clause than ease of adoptability, it should propose
a charter amendment adding a forum selection clause. While the
amendment must be approved by a majority of the shares
outstanding,270 the corporation can bundle the forum selection
clause with other provisions to encourage adoption. Even without
bundling, companies have had a high success rate when they put
the issue to the shareholders.271 If a corporation is able to pass a
charter amendment, it is assured of enforcement.
IV. Conclusion
The need for forum selection clauses is driven by the
proliferation of duplicative litigation over corporate transactions
and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. It has become
increasingly common for a corporation to be required to defend
269. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011) (stating that default
quorum to amend corporation’s bylaws is a simple majority of those present at
the shareholders’ meeting and a bylaw is passed with the approval of a majority
of those present), with id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of
the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter
amendment).
270. See id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of the
outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter
amendment).
271. See Allen, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that, of the six corporations that
proposed charter amendments, five succeeded); see also supra notes 252–53 and
accompanying text (discussing these six corporations).
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several different suits in multiple forums. This costs corporations
additional litigation expenses that only benefit the additional
lawyers required to litigate the duplicative actions. Not only does
this harm corporations, it also harms society in general which
purchases stock in the corporation and must pay for the judicial
resources required in each action. The IAD and forum non
conveniens, while useful in controlling duplicative litigation, do
not adequately prevent this problem because neither jurisdiction
is required to defer to the other.
This Note has proposed that corporations adopt forum
selection clauses in their governing documents. As the Supreme
Court noted: forum selection clauses “establishing ex ante the
forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling
any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought and
defended.”272 A corporation adopting a forum selection clause has
many choices to make: which claims to include, mandatory or
elective selection of forum, insertion into its charter or bylaw, and
whether to include exceptions to the general rule in the absence
of an indispensible party or for other specific circumstances.
Through these choices, a corporation can craft a forum selection
clause that best meets the company’s needs. A forum selection
clause provides assurance to a corporation that, while it may be
required to defend against litigation in one jurisdiction, it will not
be forced to defend against the same claim in multiple forums.
Appendix 1: Characteristics of the Prominent Forum
Selection Clauses
Claims Covered by Clause

Mandatory Charter
or Elective or Bylaw

“any action brought by any stockholder against
Gibson Dunn the Corporation or against any office, director,
Mandatory
cluster
employee, agent or advisor of the Corporation.”

Bylaw

Oracle, Inc.

“any actual or purported derivative action
Mandatory
brought on behalf of the Corporation.”

Bylaw

Netlist, Inc.

“any lawsuit or legal proceeding by the
corporation against any of its directors or
Mandatory
officers within the jurisdiction of [the Delaware
Chancery Court].”

Bylaw

272.

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
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“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any
director, officer or employee of the Corporation
Netsuite, Inc. to the Corporation or the Corporation’s Mandatory Charter
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL,
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine.”
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any
director, officer or employee of the Corporation
Financial
to the Corporation or the Corporation’s Elective
Charter
Engines, Inc.
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL,
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine.”
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any
director, officer or employee of the Corporation
Skadden
Charter
to the Corporation or the Corporation’s Elective
cluster
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL,
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine.”
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by any director or officer of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the
Skadden
cluster—Swift Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action
Elective
Charter
Transportation asserting a claim against the Corporation
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL
option
or the Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation
or By-Laws or (iv) any action asserting a claim
against the Corporation governed by the
internal affairs doctrine.”
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by any director or officer of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the
Pillsbury
Bylaw
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action Elective
cluster
asserting a claim against the Corporation
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL
or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the
Corporation governed by the internal affairs
doctrine.”
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“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by any director, officer or other employee
of the Corporation to the Corporation or the
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action
Mandatory Charter
asserting a claim against the Corporation
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL
or the Corporation’s Amendment and Restated
Certificate of Incorporation or bylaws or (iv) any
action asserting a claim against the Corporation
governed by the internal affairs doctrine.”
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by any director or officer of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action
asserting a claim against the Corporation to the
Mandatory Charter
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders,
(iv) any action asserting a claim against the
Corporation arising pursuant to any provision of
the GCL or this Certificate of Incorporation or
the Corporation’s Bylaws or (v) any action
asserting a claim against the Corporation
governed by the internal affairs doctrine.”

